How California Governs the News Media by Sylvester, Jon H.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 26 | Number 2 Article 3
1-1-1986
How California Governs the News Media
Jon H. Sylvester
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Jon H. Sylvester, How California Governs the News Media, 26 Santa Clara L. Rev. 381 (1986).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss2/3
HOW CALIFORNIA GOVERNS THE NEWS MEDIA
Jon H. Sylvester*
While California legislation is generally regarded as progres-
sive, it is not immediately clear what "progressive" means when such
democratic values as the right to information and the right to privacy
conflict. This article surveys how certain state laws impact the oper-
ations of the print and broadcast news media.
On the national scene, controversies such as the highly-publi-
cized defamation suits of General William Westmoreland and for-
mer Israel Defense Minister Ariel Sharon have prompted debate,
discussion and analysis which have focused, inevitably, on the first
amendment to the United States Constitution. Most legal battles in-
volving the press, however, achieve neither national publicity nor
constitutional proportions. Although state laws affecting the news
media must, when challenged, meet the requirements of the first
amendment, it remains a practical reality that state laws govern a
wide range of day-to-day media operations.
Laws affecting the media include a number of traditional sub-
ject areas, including constitutional law, torts, evidence, and civil,
criminal and administrative procedure. The topics discussed herein
are defamation, invasion of privacy, cameras in the courtroom, shield
law (or "reporter's privilege"), publication of recorded conversations
and pilfered documents, and legislation regarding open meetings and
open records.
I. DEFAMATION
California has several legislative provisions that concern defa-
mation (or, more specifically, slander and libel), as well as several
provisions that directly concern newspapers, radio and television.1
State policy dictates that the media be afforded its constitutional
right to inform the public of controversies surrounding sensitive is-
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1. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 45, 47, 48, 3425.1 (West 1985).
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sues of public interest.'
California allows media members a qualified privilege pursuant
to law first enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan.8 When a
public official brings an action for defamation against a media de-
fendant, he must allege and prove that the publication was made
with "actual malice."4 Actual malice is defined as "knowledge that
[the publication] was false or . .. reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."" The term "public official" was defined in New
York Times, and was later expanded to include "public figures" in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.6
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the court recognized two classi-
fications of public figures: 1) "persons who occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures
for all purposes,"' or who by reason of their fame, shape events in
areas of concern to society at large;8 and 2) persons who "have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order
to influence the resolution of issues involved."'
In California, courts have interpreted the definition of public
figure, as defined in Gertz, to further require that "the [complainant]
must have voluntarily and actively sought, in connection with any
given matter of public interest, to influence the resolution of the is-
sues involved," 10 and his position "must be one which would invite
public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it entirely apart
from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges
in controversy."' 1 The latter requirement is termed the "public con-
troversy test."'" Thus, members of the California media must cope
with a more restrictive definition of "public figure" than that of the
United States Supreme Court.
California courts have, however, endorsed the basic standard
2. Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148-49, 162 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714-15
(1980).
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1966).
4. Id. at 280.
5. Id. See also Fisher v. Larson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 627, 634, 188 Cal. Rptr. 216, 222
(1982); Weingarten, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 133, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
6. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
8. Id. at 345 (1974) (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)).
9. 418 U.S. at 345.
10. Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 927,
159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 140 (1979).
11. Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. App. 3d
646, 658-59, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 355 (1980).
12. Id. at 660, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan. Under California law, a
public figure or official in a civil defamation action against a news-
paper must show clear and convincing evidence that the allegedly
libelous publication was published with knowledge that it was false
or with a reckless disregard for the truth."
Generally, all who take a responsible part in a publication are
liable for any defamation that results from the publication.1 4 But the
mere fact that oral defamation is subsequently quoted or printed in a
newspaper does not render it libelous.15 One may not be held liable
for republication of a statement unless the original statement is
found to be defamatory. 6 In Osmond v. EWAP, Inc.," the court
refused to impose liability for the mere dissemination of libelous ma-
terial published by another on a showing that there was no reason to
believe that the publication was libelous. In Osmond, the manager
of a newspaper had no knowledge of the preparation or content of
the article he published which contained the libelous matter, and he
did not control the editorial staff. 8 Liability is imposed upon one
who delivers or transmits defamatory material published by another
only "if he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory charac-
ter."' 9 This rule protects vendors of books, magazines and
newspapers. 0
A. Statutory Defamation Provisions Relating to the Media
Both California's criminal and civil codes contain statutory pro-
visions that specifically cover the media.2' Under the civil provisions,
a person who alleges libel by a newspaper or slander by a radio
broadcast may recover only special damages. Special damages are
those that the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered with
respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, in-
cluding such amounts as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has ex-
13. Belli v. Curtiss Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 396, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122, 133
(1972).
14. Osmond v. EWAP, Inc., 153 Cal. App. 3d 842, 852, 200 Cal. Rptr. 674, 679
(1984).
15. Mercado v. Hoefler, 190 Cal. App. 2d 12, 13, 11 Cal. Rptr. 787, 791 (1961) (citing
Oberkotter v. Woolman, 187 Cal. 500, 505 (1921)).
16. Montandon v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 932, 935, 120 Cal. Rptr.
196, 197 (1975).
17. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 853, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
20. Id.
21. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 45, 47, 48, 3425.1 (West 1982).
1986]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
pended as a result of the alleged libel and no other.2" However, if a
person demands a retraction within twenty days after he receives
knowledge of a publication or broadcast of an alleged libel or slander
and a retraction is not given, the complainant may recover general
and special damages."a Exemplary damages may be also recovered, if
the plaintiff alleges and proves that the publication or broadcast was
made with actual malice. This finding is within the discretion of the
court or jury, and actual malice may not be presumed or inferred.2 '
This section does not protect magazines.2 '
Members of the media have a conditional privilege under Civil
Code section 47 to make a true and fair report of a judicial, legisla-
tive or other official public proceeding and anything "said in such
proceeding, or of a verified charge or complaint by any person to a
public official, upon which complaint a warrant shall have been is-
sued.' 26 Civil Code section 47(5) provides an absolute privilege for
the fair and true report of the proceedings of a lawful, public meet-
ing or the publication of the matter published "for the public bene-
fit. '' 2 Additionally, under Civil Code section 47(3), the media may
claim a conditional privilege for a defamatory publication if the com-
munication is made, without malice, to an interested person or to a
person so related to such person as to "afford a reasonable ground
for supposing the motive for the communication innocent" or who is
requested by the person interested to give the information.28 This
section does not protect newspapers and magazines however, when
the publication was made merely because "it relates to a matter
which may have general public interest. ' 29
Actions against California media are also limited by the Uni-
form Single Publication Act. This act precludes a person from bring-
ing more than
one cause of action for damages for libel or slander or invasion
of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publication
or exhibition or utterance, such as any one issue of a newspaper
or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience or
22. CAL. CiV. CODE § 48a(4)(b) (West 1982).
23. CAL. CiV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1982).
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(2) (West 1982).
25. Montandon v. Triangle Publications, 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 953, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186,
195 (1975).
26. CAL. CiV. CODE § 47(4) (West 1982).
27. CAL. CiV. CODE § 47(5) (West 1982).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982).
29. Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Ct., Cty. of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646,
664, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 358-59 (1980).
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any one broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition
of a motion picture.30
Under the Act, a "publication of an integrated issue of a mass media
writing occurs upon the first general distribution of the material to
the public." 1 This date is set as the earliest date on which the alleg-
edly defamatory information is "substantially and effectively commu-
nicated to a meaningful mass of readers.""2
B. Libel
The California codes include statutory provisions for both civil
and criminal libel. Civil libel is defined as "a false and unprivileged
publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed repre-
sentation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided,
or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.""3 Criminal
libel is defined as:
a malicious defamation, expressed either by writing, printing, or
by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory
of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue,
or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects of one
who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, con-
tempt, or ridicule. 4
Civil libel liability is imposed when a publication contains a
false statement of fact 5 and is unprivileged. 6 If a newspaper is in-
volved, the publication must be examined in the context of the article
in which it is included; the statement is not considered alone.87 In
addition, the person defamed must be ascertainable from the publica-
tion, although the actual name of the person need not be published. 8
30. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3425.1 (West 1985).
31. Strick v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 143 Cal. App. 3d 916, 922, 192
Cal. Rptr. 314, 317 (1983).
32. Id. (quoting Osmers v. Parade Publications, 234 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1964)).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 248 (West 1970).
35. Gregory v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 600, 552 P.2d 425, 427, 131
Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1976).
36. Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d 161, 217 P.2d 687, 691 (1950).
37. Jeffers v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 2d 717, 727-28, 328 P.2d 1030,
1037 (1958), disapproved on other grnds., MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d
536, 551, 343 P.2d 36, 44 (1959).
38. DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. American Federation of Labor & Congress of Indus. Or-
ganizations, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1963).
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Malice must be shown to sustain a civil libel action.3 9 Malice is pre-
sumed when the publication is libelous per se."' Libel on its face, or
libel per se, is a "libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without
the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innu-
endo or other extrinsic fact.""' Malice is never presumed unless the
publication is actionable as libel per se. 2 The falsity of the publica-
tion may be admissible as evidence of malice, but such evidence is
not necessarily conclusive on this point."'
A publication must be malicious to support an action for crimi-
nal libel." Malice is presumed if no "justifiable motive" is shown for
the publication.' Criminal libel is punishable by imprisonment or
fine.' The publication need not be read or seen by another to sup-
port a criminal libel charge.' All that is required is that the "ac-
cused knowingly parted with the immediate custody of the libel
under circumstances which exposed it to be read or seen by any
other person than himself."' 8 However, the communication is privi-
leged and presumed not to be malicious if it is made to a person
interested in the communication or if it is made by one who stood in
such a relation to the person interested in the communication as to
afford reasonable grounds to believe that his motive was innocent."9
Truth is admissible as evidence in a criminal libel case, and the de-
fendant will be acquitted if the trier of fact finds that the matter
charged as libelous is true and was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends.10
C. Slander
As with libel, California's slander law includes both criminal
and civil statutes. Civil slander is defined as follows:
39. Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 22
Cal. 3d 672, 680, 586 P.2d 572, 575, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 261 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
961 (1979).
40. Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 289, 38 P.
903 (1894).
41. CAL. CIv. CODE § 45a (West 1982).
42. Lewis v. Hayes, 165 Cal. 527, 533, 132 P. 1022, 1024 (1913).
43. Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d at 168, 217 P.2d at 692 (1950).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 248 (West 1970).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 250 (West 1970).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 249 (West 1970).
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 252 (West 1970).
48. Id.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 256 (West 1970).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 251 (West 1970).
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Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered,
and also communications by radio or any such or other means
which:
1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted,
convicted or punished for crime;
2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, conta-
gious or loathsome disease;
3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profes-
sion, trade or business, either by imputing to him general dis-
qualification in those respects which the office or other occupa-
tion peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with
reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a
natural tendency to lessen its profits;
4. Imputes to him impotency or a want of chastity;
5. Which, by natural consequences, causes actual damages."
Criminal slander is defined as follows:
Slander is a malicious defamation, orally uttered whether or not
it be communicated through or by radio or any mechanical or
other means or device, whatsoever, tending to blacken the mem-
ory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity,
virtue or reputation, or disclose the actual or alleged defects of
one who is living, or of any educational, literary, social, frater-
nal, benevolent or religious corporation, association or organiza-
tion, and thereby to expose him or it to public hatred or
ridicule.5 '
Unlike the civil slander provision, the criminal provision requires
that the person utter the slander "willfully and with malicious in-
tent."'" A person found guilty under Penal Code section 258 is sub-
ject to fine and/or imprisonment. "Words uttered in the proper dis-
charge of an official duty, or in any legislative or judicial proceeding
or in any other official proceeding authorized by law, shall be privi-
leged and . . . never . . . deemed a slander. . .. ""
The utterance of a slanderous statement is presumed to be mali-
cious, unless the communication was made to an "interested person"
or was made by someone who stands in such a relation to such inter-
ested person that reasonable grounds exist for believing the utterance
is innocent."' As with libel, truth is admissible as evidence and the
51. CAl.. CIv. CODE § 46 (West 1982).
52. CAl.. PENAL CODE § 258 (West 1970).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. CAl.. PENAL CODE § 259 (West 1970).
19861
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
defendant is acquitted if it appears that the utterance was made with
justifiable ends and nonmalicious motives."
Whether a statement constitutes slander is determined in light
of all of the circumstances that surround its publication.5" A slander-
ous statement must be made with malice, which means "actual or
express malice, hatred or ill will . . . beyond normal feelings toward
a wrongdoer."58
Defamation by radio or television broadcast is also considered
slander in California." Furthermore, a cause of action for slander
per se will lie when a
false and unprivileged communication by radio which tends di-
rectly to injure a person "in respect to his office, profession,
trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualifi-
cation in those respects which the office or other occupation pe-
culiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to
his office, profession, trade or business that has a natural ten-
dency to lessen its profits."60
The radio broadcast should be considered in its entirety to determine
whether or not the communication is slanderous." California Civil
Code section 48.5 precludes the imposition of liability upon the
owner, licensee or operator of a television or radio broadcasting sta-
tion or agents or employees of such persons, for broadcast of slander-
ous statements by someone other than these persons.62 If someone
other than these persons utters the slanderous remarks, that person
alone is liable for any damages for any such defamatory statement.63
II. INVASION OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy is now protected by the California Consti-
tution.6 Previously, only the common law recognized this right.
California common law recognizes four kinds of invasions of
privacy. They are: 1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or soli-
tude or into his private affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about the plaintiff; 3) publicity which places the plain-
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 260 (West 1970).
57. Arno v. Stewart, 245 Cal.' App. 2d 955, 961, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392, 396 (1966).
58. Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 969, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374 (1980).
59. Arno, 245 Cal. App. 2d at 961, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
60. Correia v. Santos, 191 Cal. App. 2d 844, 850-51, 13 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135 (1961).
61. Id.
62. CAL. CIv. CODE § 48.5 (West 1982).
63. Id.
64. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (West 1974).
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tiff in a false light in the public eye; and 4) appropriation for the
defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or likeness."e
Case law further clarifies the interpretation of each kind of in-
vasion of privacy. In order for a person to recover for "public dis-
closure of private facts, the disclosure must be public in the sense
that it is communicated to the public in general, or to a large num-
ber of persons."" The facts must be private, and not public knowl-
edge, and those facts made public must be such that would be "of-
fensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities."'67 In addition, the facts must be "an unwarranted pub-
lication of intimate details of one's private life which are outside the
realm of legitimate public interest."6
If the defendant is a member of the media and the plaintiff is a
public figure, the plaintiff must satisfy the requirement of actual
malice, as enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan," in order to
recover for false light invasion of privacy. However, if the plaintiff is
a private citizen, the standard for liability is "less than actual malice
short of liability without fault."'70 The standard for liability is higher
in a false light action because this kind of privacy invasion is consid-
ered equivalent to defamation.7 1
California has no statutory provisions for false light or "public
disclosure of private facts;" however, Civil Code section 48(a)72 is
applicable to a false light invasion of privacy claim if the defendant
is a member of the media.7 8
Common law liability for appropriation of a person's likeness
or name requires: 1) the defendant to use the plaintiff's name or
likeness to the defendant's advantage commercially or otherwise; 2)
the lack of plaintiff's consent; and 3) a resulting injury.7' California
65. Eastwood v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417, 198
Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (1983); see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 603 P.
2d 425, 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 (1979); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal.
App. 3d 825, 828, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841, (1976); Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich,
43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 887, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 375 (1974).
66. Porten, 64 Cal. 3d at 828, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
67. Sipple v. The Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1045, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 665, 667-68 (1984).
68. Id. at 1047, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
69. 376 U.S. 254 (1966).
70. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
71. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 543, 483 P.2d 34, 44, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866, 876 (1971).
72. CAL,. CIv. CODE § 48(a) (West 1982).
73. Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 893, 118 Cal. Rptr.
370, 380 (1974).
74. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
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also has statutory provisions covering commercial appropriation in-
vasion of privacy.7m
In addition to the requirements set forth above, case law re-
quires that the defendant knowingly use the plaintiff's name, photo-
graph or likeness for the purpose of advertising or solicitation of
purchases. Moreover, there must be a direct connection between the
use and the commercial purpose.7
No case law has interpreted Civil Code section 990, which was
added in 1984. However, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,77 a pre-sec-
tion 990 case, involved a section 990 issue. The action was brought
by Bela Lugosi's descendants. The court ruled that the action could
not be maintained because the right to privacy was a personal right
and did not survive Lugosi's death.78 Lugosi would probably have
been decided differently under Civil Code section 990 because that
section permits damages to be recovered for commercial appropria-
tion of a deceased person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness.7 9
III. CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
California has not followed an emerging trend toward allowing
all types of cameras in courtrooms during judicial proceedings. In
1978, California Rules of Court rule 980 was enacted on an experi-
mental basis. The rule was permanently enacted in 1984.0
Under Rule 980, members of the media are allowed to broad-
cast or record court proceedings only upon a written court order.8"
Media access to photograph, record, or broadcast court proceedings
is available only at the absolute discretion of the trial judge.82 The
trial judge has the power, in the interest of justice and to protect the
rights of the parties, to refuse such media access to the courts.83
Rule 980 prohibits film or electronic media coverage of closed
proceedings, in-chambers proceedings, and jury selection.84 Coverage
of attorney-client conferences and bench conferences is also prohib-
75. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1985).
76. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417-18, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347; see also Johnson v.
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d at 895, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (1974).
77. 25 Cal 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
78. d. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
79. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985).
80. CAL. R. CT. 980 (1984).
81. CAL. R. CT. 980(b) (1984).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. CAL. R. CT. 980(b)(2) (1984).
[Vol. 26
CALIFORNIA MEDIA
ited." Additionally, the court can restrict the type of equipment it
will permit into the courtroom even after an order has been granted
allowing media coverage." No film or electronic media coverage is
permitted which is not included in the court's order."' The key issue
in the area of fikn and video coverage of courtroom proceedings is a
proper balancing of the right of the press and public's right to know,
against the right of the defendant to a fair trial, unfettered by poten-
tially prejudicial publicity."8 This issue arises both in regard to cam-
eras in the courtroom and when the media's general right of access to
courtroom proceedings is challenged."
The courts have consistently restricted general media access to
the courts on the theory that the press has no greater right of access
than the general public. 0 The media have no constitutional right of
access to preliminary proceedings in California, such as voir dire and
preliminary hearings. 1 This is so despite California common law
which assures a defendant a right to a public preliminary hearing.' 2
This common law rule is specifically excepted by Penal Code
section 868," which requires the preliminary examination to be
open and public, but gives the defendant the right to request clo-
sure. 4 Before closure is granted, Penal Code section 868 requires a
magistrate to find that closure is necessary in order to protect the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial.9
Moreover, case law has interpreted Penal Code section 868 to
require an overriding interest supported by adequate findings that
closure is necessary to preserve that interest" before such closure is
granted.
Although the media is afforded a right of access under section
868 and Rule 980, that access is severely restricted. The permanent
85. Id.
86. CA.. R. Cr. 980(b)(3) (1984).
87. CAl.. R. Cr. 980(d) (1984).
88. San Jose Mercury News v. The Mun. Ct. for the Sunnyvale Cupertino Dist. of
Santa Clara Cty., 30 Cal. 3d 498, 502-03, 638 P.2d 655, 657, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 774 (1982).
89. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Diaz), 37 Cal. 3d 772, 691 P.2d 1026, 209
Cal. Rptr. 360, 366 (1984).
90. San Jose Mercury News, 30 Cal. 3d at 503, 638 P.2d'at 655, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
91. Id. at 508, 638 P.2d at 660-61, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
92. People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 524-26, 612 P.2d 941, 943-45, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 851, 853-54 (1980).
93. CAL.. PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1985).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 772, 691 P.2d 1026, 209
Cal. Rptr. 360 (1984).
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enactment of Rule 980 suggests that no change is likely in the near
future regarding cameras in the courtroom, despite the trend in other
states and the United States Supreme Court toward allowing elec-
tronic and film media access to courtrooms. The above-mentioned
California statutes adamantly protect a defendant's right to a fair
trial-even at the expense of public access through media coverage.
IV. SHIELD LAW
In 1980, the California Legislature amended the state constitu-
tion to grant the news media a qualified right to refuse to disclose
their sources of information.9 7 Under this provision, a member of the
news media can rarely be cited for contempt of court for failing to
reveal a news source."8 This right was first codified in 1872 under
Civil Code section 1881(b)" and later was codified under current
Evidence Code section 1070.10
Both of these provisions seek to facilitate the free flow of infor-
mation as required by the first amendment freedom of the press.'01
However, article 1, section 2 of the state constitution and Evidence
Code section 1070 protect members of the news media only against
contempt citations for failure to disclose sources of information. The
provisions do not insulate the media from other court sanctions.'02
The first amendment does not protect the press from criminal
sanctions.' 0 ' Nor are members of the media privileged to identify
court officers or those subject to court orders or the court's control."0
However, members of the media are protected from revealing all
other sources.' 08
The right to a fair trial may outweigh a press privilege against
discovery.'" In general, neither of these rights is superior to the
other. When a conflict arises, however, each must be balanced
97. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (1980).
98. Id.
99. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1881(b) (West 1965), recodified at CAL. EVID. CODE §
1070 (West Supp. 1986).
100.. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1985).
101. CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251, 149
Cal. Rptr. 421, 427 (1978).
102. See Rosato v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 427, cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1975). See also Comment, California's "New" News-
men's Shield Law and the Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 26 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 219 (1986).
103. Id. at 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
104. Id. at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 451).
105. Id.
106. CBS, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 251-52, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
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against the other with the aim of mutual accommodation and mini-
mum interference." 7 No privilege exists if the source at issue has
already been exposed to the public.0 8 Additionally, no privilege ex-
ists to conceal a source demanded by court order.' 9
Evidence Code section 1070 only applies to unpublished infor-
mation, which is "information not disseminated to the public by the
person from whom disclosure is sought."" 0 In addition, the section
only applies to news or news commentary given by a reporter who is
a member of the television or radio news media."'
The statute does not explain what type of information is
considered news. However, case law defines "news" as "a report
of a recent event, intelligence, or information about some person
or thing."' Only truth qualifies as news."' Neither case law,
nor the statute explains why information received by personnel of
magazines, newspapers, and other periodicals does not constitute
news.
V. PUBLICATION OF PILFERED DOCUMENTS
In the area of pilfered documents, two key questions are raised:
1) whether the publication of pilfered documents involves receipt of
stolen property by the publisher in addition to a possible invasion of
privacy tort, and 2) whether there is an increased penalty for receipt
of pilfered government documents and/or a presumption of theft or
knowing receipt of these documents by the publisher. No statutory
provisions directly address these issues; however, liability for inva-
sion of privacy and/or criminal penalties may be imposed upon a
person who pilfers either non-government or government documents.
Additionally, a person unauthorized to receive these documents may
be liable whether the documents were either pilfered or lawfully
obtained.
As mentioned above in Section II, Penal Code section 631(a)
sanctions could be imposed upon one who uses or attempts to use
information obtained through illegal wiretapping."" This provision
may be applicable to media members who attempt to, or who do
publish or broadcast information obtained in this manner. Moreover,
107. Id. at 252, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
108. Id. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
109. Id. at 251, n.2, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426, n.2.
110. CAl.. EVID. CODE § 1070(c) (West Supp. 1985).
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(b) (West Supp. 1985).
112. Werner v. Southern Cal. Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950).
113. Id.
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(a) (West 1985).
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because Penal Code section 631 and the criminal invasion of privacy
statutes do not appear to be limited to privacy invasions of private
citizens, these provisions could likewise be used when government
documents are unlawfully obtained.
In addition, members of the media who make unauthorized and
willful disclosure of the contents, or part of the contents of a tele-
graphic, or telephonic communication, may be punished under Penal
Code section 637.1' Likewise, the unauthorized procurement or
opening of mail addressed to another which contains a telegraphic or
telephonic message, with the intent to use the contents thereof, is
punishable."' As mentioned previously, a similar civil action may be
maintained under Penal Code section 637.2.17
With regard to government documents, Penal Code section
11143 makes a misdemeanor the receipt of criminal records or infor-
mation from such a record, by an unauthorized person. However,
this statute specifically excepts persons protected by the media shield
law or Evidence Code section 1070. In McCall v. Oroville Mercury
Co.,' 18 the plaintiff argued that Penal Code section 11143 was appli-
cable to members of the media. In that case, a newspaper obtained
from the Department of Justice and published the criminal record of
an elected official. The plaintiff contended that the records were un-
lawfully obtained pursuant to section 11143. The court held that
section 11143 exempted all members of the news media and not just
those who were subject to contempt citations for failure to disclose
sources of information. 119
Case law in the area of publication of pilfered documents is
scant when wiretapping, eavesdropping, or any other form of unau-
thorized taking is involved. However, People v. Kunkin12 0 addressed
the question of whether the publication of stolen government docu-
ments necessarily subsumed the receipt of stolen property. The court
held that sufficient evidence existed to show that the documents had
been stolen, but not enough evidence was produced to infer that the
publisher knew, or should have known that the documents were sto-
len.' 2' Presumably, then, a publisher who knew or should have
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637 (West 1985).
116. CAL PENAL CODE § 637.1 (West 1985).
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2 (West 1985).
118. McCall v. Oroville Mercury Co., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 3d 805, 191 Cal. Rptr. 280
(1983).
119. Id. at 808, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
120. People v. Kunkin, 9 Cal. 3d 245, 507 P.2d 1392, 107 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1973).
121. d. at 255-56.
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known that the documents were stolen could be prosecuted for re-
ceipt of stolen goods under Kunkin. 2 An invasion of privacy issue
was not raised in the case, but it may be assumed that such an action
would lie when the publication of the document would invade the
privacy of a person mentioned or referred to in the publication.
VI. OPEN MEETING LEGISLATION
California public policy dictates that state bodies, public agen-
cies and legislative bodies of local agencies must conduct their meet-
ings openly and in public so that the public can remain informed. 2
This is a requirement of the Bagley-Keene Act12 4 as well as of the
Brown Act.' 28
These statutory provisions specifically exempt certain meetings.
Section 11126 permits closed sessions in a number of situations, in-
cluding: meetings to consider appointment, employment or dismissal
of public employees; examination of licenses; administrative adjudi-
cations; and consideration of national security issues.' 2
Under the Bagley-Keene Act, a "state body" is defined as
"every state board or commission, or similar multimember body of
the state which is required by law to conduct official meetings and
every commission created by executive order," not including, inter
alia, meetings required to be open under the Brown Act and certain
state agencies under California Constitution article VI.' This defi-
nition includes "any board, commission, committee or any similar
multimember body which exercises any authority of a state body del-
egated to it by that state body,"'"" or "on which a member of a body
which is a state body . . . serves in his or her official representative
capacity as a representative of such state body and which is sup-
ported, in whole or in part, by funds provided by the state body."' 2 9
The term "state body" also includes advisory bodies consisting of
three or more persons (boards, committees, commissions, or subcom-
mittees) which are created by formal action of a state body or a
member of the state body.' 30
122. Id.
123. CAL.. Gov'T CODE §§ 54953 (West 1983) & 11120 (West Supp. 1986).
124. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11120-11130.7 (West 1981).
125. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-54959 (West 1983).
126. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11126 (West Supp. 1986).
127. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11121 (West Supp. 1986).
128. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11121.2 (West Supp. 1986).
129. CAl.. GOVT CODE § 11121.7 (West Supp. 1986).
130. CAL. GoV'r CODE § 11121.8 (West Supp. 1986).
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Persons who attend meetings under the Bagley-Keene Act are
not required to register their names or to fulfill any other conditions
to attend such meetings. Attendance lists or other similar documents
circulated during public meetings must indicate that signing the list
or document is completely voluntary.' 81 Meetings required to be
public must be open to all persons who wish to attend." 2 Also, the
members of the public may request to be notified of a meeting at
least ten days in advance, 8' and the notice shall include an agenda
of the meeting.'8" Furthermore, when an emergency session is called,
an agenda of that session is to be made available to the public.' 6 A
member of a state body who attends a meeting in violation of the
Bagley-Keene Act, with knowledge that the meeting is held in viola-
tion of the Act, is guilty of a misdemeanor.'
The Brown Act permits closed sessions, when legislative bodies
of local agencies meet with law enforcement officers to discuss possi-
ble threats to the security of, or access to, public buildings," 7 and
when license applications are issued.' 8 The Act also permits the ex-
clusion, during the examination of a witness, of other witnesses in
the same investigative matter.' 39
Like the Bagley-Keene Act, the Brown Act provides that a per-
son attending a public meeting is not required to meet any condi-
tions, such as registration, or completion of a questionnaire. 40 Any
person is allowed to tape the proceedings of an open and public ses-
sion, provided such action does not disrupt the meeting. 4' The legis-
lative body of a local agency is to provide in its by-laws or by resolu-
tion, a time and place for its regular meetings.' 42 A notice of each
regular meeting must be mailed, at least one week before such meet-
ing, to each person within the district who has filed a written request
for such notice with the legislative body at issue.' Meetings may be
continued by order or notice of continuance, provided that notice of
131. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 11124 (West Supp. 1986).
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11123 (West Supp. 1986).
133. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11125(a) (West Supp. 1986).
134. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11125(b) (West Supp. 1986).
135. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11125(g) (West Supp. 1986).
136. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11130.7 (West Supp. 1986).
137. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54957 (West 1983).
138. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54956.7 (West 1983).
139. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54957 (West 1983).
140. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54953.3 (West 1983).
141. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54953.5 (West 1983).
142. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54954 (West 1983).
143. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54954.1 (West 1983).
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such continuance is conspicuously posted."
The exceptions of the acts are to be narrowly construed, so as to
favor disclosure and the intent of the Legislature to keep the public
informed of the functions of governmental and public agencies. " 5
In San Diego Union v. City Council of City of San Diego, a
case involving the Brown Act, the court held that city council ses-
sions at which salaries of nonelected city officers or employees are
discussed may be closed to the public." However, council sessions to
discuss the amount of a salary increase for a specific individual must
be open to the public.14 7 Minutes of a meeting held in violation of
the Brown Act are subject to disclosure."'
VII. OPEN RECORDS LEGISLATION
The Public Records Act of 1968"" was enacted to curb govern-
mental secrecy and to ensure individual privacy.' 50 The Legislative
Open Records Act,' 5 ' and the Public Records Act declare that "ac-
cess to information concerning the conduct of the people's business
by the Legislature is a fundamental and necessary right of every citi-
zen."' " As a result of California's policy favoring the disclosure of
public records, the exceptions to the Public Records Act are to be
narrowly construed so as to give effect to the legislative intent to
curtail governmental secrecy."'
The primary issue under the Public Records Act is whether the
records are "public records." "Public records," as defined by the
statute, include "any writing containing information relating to the
conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used or retained by
any state or local agency regardless of physical form or
characteristics.' ' 54
144. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 54955.1 (West 1983).
145. Register Div. of Freedom Newspaper v. Orange City, 158 Cal. App. 3d 893, 907-
08, 205 Cal. Rptr. 92, 100 (1984); San Diego Union v. City Council of City of San Diego,
146 Cal. App. 3d 947, 955, 196 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1983).
146. San Diego Union, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 955, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
147. Id. at 956, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
148. Register Div. of Freedom Newspaper, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 907, 205 Cal. Rptr. at
101.
149. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 6250-6626 (West 1983).
150. Register Div. of Freedom Newspaper, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 902, 205 Cal. Rptr. at
97; see also San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 766, 772, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 415, 420 (1983).
151. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 9070 (West 1980).
152. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250 (West 1983) & 9070 (West 1980).
153. San Gabriel Tribune, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
154. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6252(d) (West 1983).
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This definition, as further expanded by case law, covers "every
conceivable kind of record that is involved in the governmental pro-
cess and will pertain to any new form of record keeping instrument
as it is developed. Only purely personal information unrelated to the
'conduct of the public's business' is exempt."1 '
The Act specifies which agencies must provide written guide-
lines on the accessibility of such records,156 which records are pub-
lic, 15 7 and which records are exempted.'
Even though the Public Records Act does not specifically cover
court records, such records are considered public and are available
for inspection by the public, including the news media, unless a spe-
cific exception exists for making such records nonpublic. 59 However,
a court may not grant to the media a greater right of access to its
records than it grants to the general public. The court can tempora-
rily restrict access to its records upon a showing of good cause.'" In
re Estate of Hearst states, in dictum, that no unrestrained right of
the news media to gather information exists merely because the news
media has the right to publish such information. 61
As under both the Brown Act and the Bagley-Keene Act, com-
peting interests must be balanced when disclosure is sought under
the Public Records Act. The courts seek to balance the public's right
of access to information against both the government's need to pre-
serve secrecy and the individual's right to privacy. 62 A public official
may withhold disclosure when the public interest in nondisclosure
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. 6 In each case, a court
has the duty to weigh the benefits and costs of disclosure.
1 4
The Public Records Act is modeled after the Federal Freedom
of Information Act.165 However, the Federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act does not include a provision similar to the Public Records
155. San Gabriel Tribune, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (quoting 58
Op. Att'y Gen. 629, 633-34 (1975)).
156. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6253 (West 1983).
157. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 6254.7, 6254.8 (West 1983).
158. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6254 (West 1983).
159. In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1977)
(citing Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 220-22, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968)).
160. Id. at 785, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
161. Id.; see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
162. CBS, Inc. v. Block, 160 Cal. App. 3d 866, 207 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1984), hearing
granted, L.A. 32029, Jan. 17, 1985.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6255 (West 1983).
165. 5 U.S.C. §552 (1977).
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Act above, which requires a balancing of these interests."' Govern-
ment code section 6255 provides a balancing test by which records
that are not ordinarily exempt under the Public Records Act may be
withheld from disclosure, if it is in the public interest to do so.16 7
Nondisclosure is in the public interest when the disclosure
would expose an individual's personal or financial information," or
state secrets, 169 or information retained by governmental agencies. 170
Government Code section 6255 is based on California's common law
rule that "public policy demands that certain records should not be
open to indiscriminate public inspection, even if they are in the cus-




The California Constitution has institutionalized the freedom of
speech and of the press in article I, section 2(a). However, these first
amendment guarantees are not absolute; they may be regulated . 7
When a person's exercise of first amendment rights infringes upon
the rights of another, civil or criminal actions may lie to curtail, pre-
vent, or to punish such infringements.1 73 Accurate generalizations re-
garding the implementation of the above-stated policy are difficult,
but it appears that California's courts and Legislature tend to lean
toward the protection of news media when the countervailing interest
is primarily a governmental interest. Conversely, when the exercise
of "media rights" would tend to infringe on individual rights, the
policy of the state seems to favor the protection of the threatened
individual rights.17 4
One issue which pervades the separate topics surveyed in this
166. Id.
167. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 6255 (West 1983).
168. CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 6254(c), 6254(i) (West 1983).
169. CA,.. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f) (West 1983).
170. CAI. Gov'r CODE § 6254(a) (West 1983); see CBS, Inc. v. Block, 160 Cal. App.
3d 866, 207 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 (1984).
171. Id.; see also City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 156,
238 P.2d 581 (1951).
172. Horace Hosford v. California State Personnel Bd., 74 Cal. App. 3d 302, 306, 141
Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (1977).
173. People v. Young, 33 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 747, 85 P.2d 231 (1938), rev'd on other
grnds., 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
174. This approach may partially explain California's position on the question of
whether to allow cameras in the courtroom during judicial proceedings. On this issue, Califor-
nia's courts-often leaders of reform-have declined even to become followers of what appears
to be a clear trend toward increased (and presumptive) media access.
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article is likely to be a significant factor in the future development of
these areas of the law. It is the question of whether the media are
entitled to rights which are greater than those afforded to the general
public. The issue is especially pertinent with regard to access. Any
analysis of this issue must recall that the rights often referred to as
belonging to the media or to the press, are in fact, rights also belong-
ing to the public. While often asserted as a reason for denying the
news media greater access than that afforded the general public, 176
this fact is also the media's best argument for special protection and
expanded access. California courts have, thus far, refused to accept
this argument. However, there is reason to suspect that the United
States Supreme Court will eventually grant the media greater right
of access.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,'76 the United States Supreme
Court upheld exclusion of the press and public from a pre-trial
hearing concerning the suppression of evidence in a criminal trial. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized that the right to a
public trial, as set forth in the sixth amendment, belongs to the ac-
cused, and, therefore, cannot be invoked by the press or by the pub-
lic. 77 The Court acknowledged, but declined to answer, whether the
first amendment, as applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, '7 affords both public and the press the rights to attend
criminal trials.1 79
However, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia'"0 the
Court distinguished Gannett as applicable only to pre-trial proceed-
ings, and held succinctly "that the right to attend criminal trials is
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." '' Just as a me-
dia plaintiff institutionalized and vindicated a public right in Rich-
mond Newspapers, the media are uniquely situated to exercise cer-
tain first amendment rights traditionally belonging to the public. "As
a practical matter . . . the institutional press is the likely, and fit-
ting, chief beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the
'agent' of interested citizens, and funnels information about trials to
a large number of individuals."'' The Richmond Newspapers case
175. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
176. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
177. Id. at 383-84.
178. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
179. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 393.
180. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
181. Id. at 580 (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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also preserved, (albeit in a footnote to a concurring opinion), the
"conceptually separate, yet related, question . . . whether the media
should enjoy greater access rights than the general public." 8 '
If the media are to be effective surrogates for the public with
regard to its access, the media must sometimes be treated differently
from the public.
If a television reporter is to convey ...sights and sounds to
those who cannot personally visit [a] place, he must use cameras
and sound equipment. In short, terms of access that are reason-
ably imposed on individual members of the public may, if they
impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be un-
reasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to
the general public what the visitors see. 8
"News media rights," although derivative, seem destined for in-
creasing institutionalization. This result seems likely, even in light of
the current composition and apparent disposition of the United
States Supreme Court, which seems to have rejected absolutist ap-
proaches to the first amendment in favor of an ad hoc balancing of
interests.
183. Id.
184. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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